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Abstract
In the ﬁfth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation has changed the diagnosis of gender identity disorder to gender dysphoria (GD). In this critical narrative
review we ask: What is gender dysphoria? We report on some of the inconsistencies in the articles that fore-
ground distress while obfuscating the fact that not all trans and intersex people suffer stress or impaired func-
tioning, and the inappropriate referencing to intersex people in the diagnostic criterion, claims about the GD
diagnosis contributing to the depathologization of and reducing stigma surrounding trans people, the concep-
tualizations of ‘‘gender dysphoric’’ research subjects, and ﬁnally we question the etiological approaches using GD
as a conceptual framework. We further suggest that there are a number of methodological issues that need to be
resolved to be able to claim that the GD diagnosis can be validated. To shed light on these paradoxes and meth-
odological issues in the DSM-5, we report on the content validity of GD by reviewing research articles postdiag-
nostic inception. These ﬁndings will contribute to the debate about the validity of GD as a diagnosis for the 21st
century for those people who need to live a different gender to that assigned at birth.
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Introduction
There is an existing controversy about how diagnostic
texts address medical interventions related to gender
transition.1–3 In the ﬁfth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5 (DSM-
5), the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has
changed the diagnosis of gender identity disorder
(GID) to gender dysphoria (GD).4 The DSM-IV’s5 diag-
nosis of GID assumes that diverse gender identities are
inherently disordered and consequently perceived by
many to be stigmatizing. A review of GID was, therefore,
a key focus in developing the DSM-5’s diagnosis of GD.
On the APA’s webpage titled DSM-5 Development, it
stated that from 2007 until the end of 2012 each work
group met and reviewed DSM-IV’s strengths and prob-
lems, from which research questions and hypotheses
were developed.6 Moreover, they stated that literature
reviews, targeted research analyses, and a review of
clinical expertise followed from which a draft DSM-5
diagnostic criterion was developed and then a ﬁnal ap-
proved manual was released in May 2013.
Signiﬁcantly, however, in terming the new diagnosis
‘‘gender dysphoria,’’ the APA adopted a term that was
already well used within popular and academic dis-
course to describe experiences of distress within gender
diverse populations, but that had not previously been a
diagnosis. Making use of existing and familiar termi-
nology with a goal to reduce pathologization is poten-
tially counter-productive if the result is lack of clarity
over how terminology is being used. In particular,
there is a danger that a term that is now the name of
a speciﬁc diagnosable psychiatric disorder may simul-
taneously be applied to individuals, populations, or ex-
periences that do not meet diagnostic criterion and
that, according to the APA, should not be considered
pathological.
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In this article, we explore how the concept of ‘‘gen-
der dysphoria’’ has been narrativized within the scien-
tiﬁc literature since the introduction of the DSM-5 in
2013, with a particular focus upon how far current ac-
ademic usage reﬂects the diagnostic criterion.
The emphasis upon distress was one of the main rea-
sons for changing GID to GD, as indicated in a memo
from the members of the work group tasked to update
the diagnosis. The memo states, ‘‘This proposed name
change is also consistent with the general argument
that the diagnostic term should, in a more transparent
way, indicate that it pertains to distress’’7(p. 902) as the
clinical problem and not the gender identity.
The full list of ‘‘new’’ diagnostic indicators are ‘‘a
strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or second-
ary sex characteristics because of a marked incongruence
with one’s experienced/expressed gender,’’ ‘‘a strong de-
sire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics
of the other gender,’’ ‘‘a strong desire to be of the other
gender,’’ and ‘‘a strong conviction that one has the typ-
ical feelings and reactions of the other gender.’’ In addi-
tion, in the DSM-5, GD ‘‘is associated with clinically
signiﬁcant impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning.’’4(p. 452–3)
An added advantage of the name change, it was also
argued, was the elimination of the pathologizing effects
of the GID diagnosis.7 However, there is a curious ca-
veat in the manual that clearly states that ‘‘not all indi-
viduals will experience distress as a result of [.]
incongruence’’4 (p. 451) despite a strong desire for med-
ical interventions, such as psychological therapy, hor-
mone therapy, and/or surgeries to alleviate what the
authors assert are patients’ perceived incongruence be-
tween their gender identities and bodies.8 In addition,
there is a post-transition speciﬁer4 (p. 453) within the
manual, which enables clinicians to apply a code for
health insurance reimbursement for those trans and in-
tersex people who require ongoing treatments, but have
no (more) signs of dysphoria.
The diagnosis of GD, therefore, encompasses some
social and psychological factors and some forms of de-
sire within the wide ranging ‘‘symptoms.’’ We suggest,
however, that the diagnosis contains a few fundamental
paradoxes.
First, it is far from transparent how the new diagno-
sis of GD is supposed to fully relate to distress and not
identity when distress is not necessarily present. Sec-
ond, earlier in the DSM-III,9 the authors excluded
intersex conditions from the diagnosis of GID; how-
ever, they could be diagnosed in the DSM-IV5 under
the diagnostic category ‘‘GID Not Otherwise Speciﬁed,’’
which distinguished those who were experiencing se-
vere identity conﬂict.10 The diagnosis of GD now
includes intersex people comparably with trans people
if their clinically assigned gender at birth causes them
‘‘distress’’ for at least 6 months, or they are experiencing
two or more symptomatic indicators. It is unclear
which indicators can capture intersex people in relation
to a marked incongruence with their experienced/
expressed gender and identiﬁcation with the other gen-
der, or desire to be of the other gender, or a strong con-
viction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of
the other gender. What is the DSM-5 referring to by
writing ‘‘the other gender’’?4 (p. 453) It seems to us
that there is no inherent singular ‘‘other gender’’ in re-
lation to intersex people’s gender.
We noted previously a statement from the APA argu-
ing the ability to translate the ﬁndings that had been
‘‘found’’ during the evidence review process into a work-
able diagnosis. A workable diagnosis’ validation should
be open to public scrutiny and, moreover, would be de-
pendent on the design, sampling strategy, weight of ev-
idence, and most importantly research question. Despite
these stated principles, the necessary details do not ap-
pear to have been released for public scrutiny. This ob-
fuscates the difﬁculty of translating the many potential
studies’ research ﬁndings that used sophisticated re-
search methods across the different scientiﬁc communi-
ties.11 The diagnosis of GD, we will argue, cannot be
validated according to what the scientiﬁc community
claim to be standard methodological principles.
To shed light on these paradoxes and methodological
issues, we report on a narrative review wherein we sought
to explore the narrativization of GD post its inception as a
diagnosis within the DSM-5. This study is a narrative re-
view, asking simply, What is gender dysphoria? We an-
swer this by investigating whether and to what extent
the narratives in the published literature relate to the di-
agnostic criterion and narrative depiction in the DSM-5.
We also assess how the scientiﬁc community narra-
tivizes the concept of GD and the extent to which this
is inﬂuenced and shaped by the diagnostic criterion,
symptomology, and description within the DSM-5. We
did this by conducting a multidisciplinary systematic
narrative review. The rationale for this is that the GD di-
agnosis is often used in multiple ways in the academic
and pedagogical contexts, which we suggest is inevitable
because of the confusion already noted. As such, the
importance of garnering an understanding of the GD
diagnosis and its usage in published literature across
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all disciplines will highlight its potential paradigmatic
inﬂuence in social, psychological, and medicolegal con-
texts, alongside its actual validity as a diagnosis for the
21st century for those people who need to live a differ-
ent gender to that assigned at birth.
Controversial Psychiatric Diagnostics
GD syndrome was ﬁrst used in an article by Fisk,12 (p. 388)
who claimed that the term developed out of clinical
necessity and grew in an ‘‘organic and naturalistic man-
ner’’ and furthermore attended to the rise in demand
from people needing to transition from their assigned
birth gender. The term ‘‘dysphoria’’ stems from the
Greek meaning difﬁcult to bear. In the area of gender
and sexuality, Kutchins and Kirk13(p. x) show that within
the APA’s organizational processes of developing diag-
noses, a ‘‘strange mix of social values, political compro-
mise, scientiﬁc evidence, and material for insurance
claim forms’’ is introduced. At the helm of diagnostic re-
form of the GID diagnosis was the chair of the work
group Kenneth J. Zucker, who claimed that the change
from GID to GD better describes the distress that
some trans and intersex people experience when their
gender identity is ‘‘incongruently’’ experienced.14
In relation to trans diagnoses, contestations have been
widely documented.1,2,13–18 The diagnosis was devel-
oped amid demonstrations against ongoing psychiat-
ric pathologization, by trans and intersex activists who
were arguing against the draft diagnosis,1,19 the ‘‘thera-
peutic’’ approaches toward gender diverse children,2,20
and how the psychiatric diagnosis plays a fundamental
part in insurance-based health care provision and legal
recognition requirements in many parts of the world.1
Another political controversy posits skepticism on
the submitted scientiﬁc evidence gathered for/by the
work group for the development and ‘‘improvement’’
of the diagnosis.14,21 Creators of the GD diagnosis
claimed that the science used to underpin its develop-
ment was rigorous. However, it is impossible to scruti-
nize such claims, since the discussions, methodological
processes, and promised ﬁeld trials of the diagnosis
have not been published.
Even if the evidence were available for scrutiny, it is
likely that the meta-reviews would have been based on
a heterogeneous range of methods, design, and para-
digmatic approaches and although in principle this
could have been eventually standardized, there would
be substantial difﬁculties in doing so. In particular, it
would be necessary to synthesize studies using a
range of different terms, such as transsexual, transgen-
der, GID, and GD into an overarching GD diagnosis.
Such terms represent at once identity positions and
(different) symptomatic conditions. Nonetheless,
the evidence that was used was judged by the APA
committee members and board of trustees to be suf-
ﬁcient enough to formulate the GD diagnosis.
Science and the DSM
At the DSM’s inception, science about gender and sex-
uality was of little importance and diagnoses were
based on moralistic clinical perceptions.13,16,22,23
Apparently this changed in the lead up to publishing
the DSM-III, which was advertised as using scientiﬁc
standards, empirical investigation, and data to de-
velop diagnoses that can endure empirical scrutiny.13
However, critics have suggested that in the following
manifestation DSM-IV-TR,24 the diagnosis of GID
lacked scientiﬁc rigor, resulting in stigmatizing effects,
and that the criterion constructed trans people’s
identities as disordered because they expressed their
genders differently to stereotypical masculinities and
femininities associated with their assigned gender.14,25
Moreover, professionals working in the ﬁeld of gen-
der transitions and diagnostics critique the previous di-
agnosis of GID for its dependence on ﬁxed categories of
gender and gender role expressions and behaviors and,
also, argued that there was a lack of reliable and valid
diagnostic criterion.26–29
The APA’s website30 sets out its approach to rating
‘‘scientiﬁc data,’’ with double-blind randomized control
trials considered to be the best. In the event of a gap in
high-quality research, the evidence work groups should
review are (subjective) clinical observation data and
come to a consensus. Clinical data and consensus are
low on the APA’s scientiﬁc scale, because they are
highly unreliable and dependent on the views of clini-
cian(s). Such data are inevitably inﬂuenced by clini-
cians’ political leanings and paradigmatic approaches
to psychiatry. Clearly, it is neither practically possible
nor ethically appropriate to conduct double-blind ran-
domized control trials upon interventions related to
gender transition. As a consequence, the validity that
was reported31 underpinning the diagnosis of GD
was primarily reliant upon clinical consensus: evidence
that is considered by the APA to be relatively low qual-
ity and reliant on a relatively limited amount of scien-
tiﬁc evidence drawing on the research of a small
number of psychiatrists/sexologists.
There is limited evidence within the public domain
of systematically evaluating the reviews that took place
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during the DSM-5 revision process. Nonetheless, the
change from GID to the new diagnosis of GD was
pitched as a product of a democratized process, consid-
ering broader knowledges and demonstrating the di-
verse phenomenology of trans and intersex people.32
The APA offered two periods for public feedback, invit-
ing opinion and criticism about gender issues, resulting
in the third largest category to receive input for the
DSM-5’s revision process,33 it is unclear how these con-
tributions were used or assessed leading Ansara and
Hegarty21 to conclude that the ‘‘synthesis of evidence’’
was created by an invisible network of researchers who
contribute to the ideological delegitimization of trans
(and now intersex) people’s own classiﬁcations of their
genders and bodies.
Validity and Reliability
A few studies have attempted a dimensional assessment
of GD in different populations. For example, Cohen-
Kettenis and van Goozen34 reported on the psychometric
properties of the Utrecht gender dysphoria scale (UGDS)
that has poles that range from not dysphoric to dys-
phoric, and that consists of 12 questions rated on a
5-point scale. They reported that the tool successfully dis-
criminated ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female’’ transsexuals from same-
sex controls, resulting in discriminant validity. Smith
et al.35 also used the scale to evaluate the outcomes of
gender conﬁrmation treatment outcomes reporting that
GD was totally eradicated in their sample following in-
terventions. The Gender Identity/Gender Dysphoria
Questionnaire for Adolescents and Adults (GIDYQ-
AA) developed by Deogracias et al.36(p. 371) said that
their GD scale worked with a ‘‘bipolar continuum
with a male pole and a female pole and varying de-
grees of gender dysphoria, gender uncertainty, and
gender identity transitions between the poles.’’
In a recent study,8 it was suggested that the two
scales, although both designed to measure the degree
of GD, will do so in different ways because each instru-
ment captures only some aspects of the construct. The
report submitted to the APA37 does not set out the
methodology used to evaluate research used to develop
the GD diagnosis. As such, it is impossible to assess the
reliability or validity of the methodology. This maybe,
in part, be due to the links not being populated on the
APA website, leading us to assume that the ﬁeld trials
were not undertaken. There was the possibility of ana-
lyzing 10 pieces of research/reviews for establishing the
GD diagnosis.30 The studies consisted of literature re-
views and secondary data analyses. However, the studies
admitted to the review were not looking at distress but at
gender nonconformity. Yet, according to the DSM-5
working group, the key distinction between DSM-IV
and DSM-5 is the recognition that gender nonconfor-
mity and distress are not the same things, and that gen-
der nonconformity is not pathological in its own right.
Basing the diagnosis of GD on studies of gender non-
conformity, while simultaneously claiming to be depa-
thologizing gender nonconformity, is clearly neither
logical nor methodologically robust.
Quantitative researchers would normally use statisti-
cal methods to associate a new instrument’s utility with
existing measures in other instruments.38 This was not
possible in this instance, since the review was a second-
ary analysis of (qualitative) conclusions. Qualitative
tools used in empirical literature reviews and in the eval-
uation of secondary data analyses cannot be validated
using statistical criteria.39,40 The qualitative validity of
the GD diagnosis could be assessed, in a commonsense
way, through the credibility of an explanation, interpre-
tation, and observation if its use is consistent among cli-
nicians and researchers, and in the way it was intended.
This can be described loosely as content validity.41
There is then a possibility that content validity of GD
could be determined by its consistent use in the litera-
ture and what ought to have happened during the devel-
opment process of constructing the GD diagnosis. Given
that GD is a diagnosis primarily derived from an
asserted scientiﬁc consensus, it seems appropriate to
test it through exploring the degree of scientiﬁc consen-
sus upon what GD is. We will attempt in the results of
this study to go some way in unpacking the content
validity of the GD diagnosis after its inception in 2013.
Aim(s)
This study is a narrative review, asking simply, What
is gender dysphoria? We answer this research question
by examining the content validity and investigating
whether and to what extent the narratives in the pub-
lished literature relate to the diagnostic criterion and
narrative depiction in the DSM-5. In this article, we as-
sess how the scientiﬁc community narrativizes the con-
cept of GD and the extent to which this is shaped by the
diagnostic criterion, symptomology, and description
within the DSM-5. We did this by conducting a multi-
disciplinary systematic narrative review.
Because primary research varies within different re-
search paradigms ontologically, epistemologically, the-
oretically, and ideologically,42 a narrative review was
chosen to understand the ways in which the diagnosis
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of GD is understood and used in contemporary peer
reviewed literature.
We took the stance that the narratives that are told
about GD within the literature can be adequately un-
derstood through describing the narrative patterns
therein. We assumed that the narrative patterns and
the concept of GD were intrinsically entwined in such
a way that the narrative impacts the concept and the
concept impacts the narrative. Thus, it is now sensible
to start enquiring into the diagnostic validity of GD in
light of the literature that followed its DSM-5 inception.43
As such, this article determines what GD is (in the liter-
ature) and then makes some observations about the
conceptual rigor in the scholarly area of trans and in-
tersex people, who continue to be, from our analysis,
somewhat problematically depicted in academic fora.
The importance of garnering an understanding of
GD and its usage is to highlight its potential social and
paradigmatic inﬂuence within academic contexts along-
side the expediency of the diagnosis for the 21st century.
Methods
A narrative approach to the research question, what is
gender dysphoria, warranted very little exclusion crite-
ria. We wanted to explore the ways that the concept
was situated in the narrative structure of the articles.
The concept of GD and its narrativization would be
able to uncover the ways that it is utilized, explained, an-
alyzed, and tested for in (participant) samples, artifacts,
legal statues, and policies within the published work.
The term we used was GD inclusive of the dates
April 2013 and June 2016. The rationale behind choos-
ing this yearly range was that ‘‘gender dysphoria’’ be-
came the ofﬁcial diagnosis in the DSM-5.4 Moreover,
the diagnosis would provide the framework from which
an evaluation and understanding of how researchers,
scholars, and clinicians were narrating the diagnosis
of GD in their work.
The initial results from 46 health, psychology, science,
social, and humanities databases yielded 5765 articles
(Table 1). The Elton B. Stephens Company (EBSCO)
host was used that searches all available databases.
EBSCO host reduced the number of retrieved literature
to 2554 items in the printout, due to exact duplicates
being automatically removed. After mining the database
results manually we removed a further 1994 articles due
to more duplication, and by removing all news items, we
were left with560 articles. We mined further by remov-
ing another 173 articles because they were commentaries,
letters to editors, not in English, or the term GDwas only
present in the correspondence address, keywords, or in
the name of a gender identity clinic, and did not feature
in the main body of the article. This left a total of 387 ar-
ticles to analyze (Supplementary Table S1).
We uploaded all the articles into Endnote and each
author was randomly allocated articles who then
searched for the term GD. We cut and pasted the par-
agraphs in which GD featured and placed it into a
document, then uploaded it into NVivo to code in-
ductively. We also read each of the articles to get a
sense of the overall narrative and analytical frame-
work. Each author produced codes separately.
Each month the authors met and started to discuss
the codes. We reﬁned the coding framework at each
Table 1. Initial Search Results
Database Results Database Results Database Results
NewsBank 2258 TDX 26 SwePub 3
ScienceDirect 941 Humanities International Index 24 Research Starters 3
PsycINFO 413 Japanese Periodical Index 10 MLA International Bibliography 3
CINAHL Complete 382 British Library EThOS 6 Airiti Library eBooks & Journals 2
MEDLINE 299 Credo Reference Collections 6 Informit Health Collection 2
Newswires 268 Harvard Library Bibliographic Dataset 6 RACO 2
PsycARTICLES 216 SciELO 6 ERIC 2
Social Sciences Citation Index 167 Oxford Reference 5 RECERCAT 1
Science Citation Index 144 Arts & Humanities Citation Index 5 British Education Index 1
Business Source Complete 135 Teacher Reference Center 5 Alexander Street Press 1
LexisNexis Academic: Law Reviews 108 Art Full Text (H.W. Wilson) 4 Bibliotheksverbund Bayern 1
Food Science Source 107 Informit Humanities
& Social Sciences Collection
4 JSTOR Journals 1
SPORTDiscus 86 International Bibliography of Theatre
& Dance with Full Text
4 Oxford Handbooks Online 1
PsycBOOKS 40 Library, Information Science
& Technology Abstracts
4
HeinOnline 31 PsycCRITIQUES 3
OAIster 26 RCAAP 3
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meeting and discussed both the obvious substantive
codes that we were both developing independently
and the ‘‘outliers.’’ The coding framework began to
morph over a period of 8 months into agreed upon
sets of hierarchical coding, which we present in this ar-
ticle. Some coded paragraphs ﬁt into more than one
code and theme, depending on the narrative it told.
These are important ﬁndings as they emphasize a com-
plex often conﬂated and repeatedly questionable use of
the diagnostic concept.
Results
We ideographically developed a number of metadata
source types to enable us to see whether there were
any patterns in the ways that the discipline, the geogra-
phy of the article, and the sample type impacted on the
narratives of GD:
 Article type: empirical, case study, reviews (meta-
syntheses, etc.), discourse (legal and medical/
health care frameworks).
 Country: not applicable (reviews), multiple re-
search sites, comparative research, and 33 coun-
tries across the world.
 Discipline: cultural, psychology, biology, law, his-
tory, social science, philosophy, bioethics, medi-
cal, surgery, and misc. therapies, health services,
and religion.
 Referred to DSM-5 criteria: yes/no.
 Research samples: trans men, trans women, mixed
trans adults, trans boys, trans girls, mixed trans
children, mixed trans adult and children, trans-
gender, genderqueer/nonbinary, ‘‘disorders of
sex development’’ (‘‘DSD’’), cisgender, trans and
‘‘DSD,’’ ‘‘DSD’’ and cisgender, LGBT, artifacts,
statutes, policies, ﬁctitious (ﬁlm and literature).
There were no discernable patterns garnered from
the metadata. Nearly 45% of articles referred to GD
as a diagnostic term for trans people and/or intersex
people, and the remaining articles assumed GD in
their work without citing the DSM-5. The three
major narrative themes we will be drawing on in this
article are: (1) Distress and Diagnoses, (2) Types of




The number of articles that offered a description of GD
from the DSM-5 was 49% (Supplementary Table S2).
This left 51% of the articles (see Supplementary
Table S1: references with *) that conceptualized GD
in ways other than as a diagnostic concept, which we
comment on further hereunder. Just >46% of the arti-
cles that referenced the DSM-5, however, did not fully
outline the diagnosis as it appears. These articles trun-
cated the description, which resulted in an interpreta-
tion of the diagnosis that foregrounded arguments of
‘‘distress.’’ For instance, most of the articles suggested
that the distress could be alleviated after the process
of assessment and surgical interventions and that mul-
tidisciplinary teams were the teams to diagnose and
support any medical interventions necessary. Only
eight articles (just >2%, see Supplementary Table S2:
references with *) included a full description, such as
Barry et al.s’,44 who noted that the incongruence be-
tween gender identity and assigned gender does not in-
terfere with all trans people’s lives; they are completely
contented living just the way they are or may desire
some forms of medical intervention, and it is only for
a subset of transgender people, however, the incongru-
ence results in GD, that is, a feeling of stress and dis-
comfort with one’s assigned gender.
Six of the articles including a full depiction of the di-
agnosis were reviews in psychology, one article was
from law, and one article was from a group of clinicians
working in a U.K. gender clinic who stated, ‘‘We have
previously questioned the value of distress as a core cri-
terion for diagnosis in DSM classiﬁcation as it is a very
general use of language, not speciﬁcally pathogno-
monic for any mental or physical illness, disorder or
condition, and rather open to a wide range of interpre-
tation as to what constitutes marked or clinically signif-
icant distress.’’45(p. 165)
Depathologizes gender nonconformity
Quite a number of articles (14.5%: Supplementary
Table S3) endorse the DSM-5 work group’s claims
that the new diagnostic criterion serves to depatholo-
gize gender nonconformity. These ranged from ambi-
tious claims, such as ‘‘DSM-5 also recognizes gender
identity in individuals as an option and not a stigma-
tized mental illness,’’46(p. 422) to lesser but no less
problematic assertions, such as ‘‘the term ‘gender dys-
phoria’ has replaced gender identity disorder and this
change in terminology removes the ‘pathology’ from
being transgender, which is not a mental health con-
dition.’’47(p. 792) In addition, this and 5.7% (Supple-
mentary Table S4) of other articles highlight that
transgender identities are no longer considered a sign
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of pathology, but an aspect of human diversity. Seman-
tically this may be true; however, they offer no indica-
tion of how or why the change in name removes
pathology from being transgender.
The GD diagnosis within the DSM-5 emphasizes
‘‘incongruence’’ between assigned gender and experi-
enced gender, and sets out diagnostic criterion such
as the desire to be treated as one’s experienced gender
within society, or a conviction that one’s feelings or re-
actions are typical of people with the same gender iden-
tity. Wishing to be treated as a woman or man within
society, or believing that one’s feelings are typical of
one’s status as a woman or man, would plainly not
be considered diagnostic indicators for cisgender peo-
ple. As such, the diagnosis continues to assume that
the gender identities of trans and intersex people
should be regarded differently to those cisgender peo-
ple. As Aiken48 argues, although removing the word
‘‘disorder’’ from the diagnosis, the new entry in the
DSM-5 still maintains the notion that transgender- or
gender-nonconforming individuals are mentally ill.
Diagnosis and stigma
Many of the articles (12%: Supplementary Table S5) ar-
ticulated that trans people and to a much lesser extent
intersex people were often discriminated against, suf-
fered much abuse, and occupied a stigmatized position
in society. Campbell et al.s’43 review highlighted that
much of the distress associated with trans and intersex
people appears to reﬂect social stigmatization from neg-
ative reactions from family, friends, and society.
Although the majority of these articles acknowledged
that psychiatric diagnoses can stigmatize populations,
3.1% (Supplementary Table S6) of the articles (including
some that also suggested widespread discrimination and
stigma) claimed that the change in nomenclature from
GID to GD would reduce this stigma. Little evidence
was provided for this claim, and it seems questionable
to conclude that changing diagnostic terminology in a
clinical manual would substantially address discrimina-
tion and stigma within wider society.
Not all trans and intersex people suffer from GD
The claimed destigmatizing and depathologizing ef-
fects in the literature were derived from the assertion
in the DSM-5 that it is the distress and not the gender
diversity that is diagnosable. Despite this, many articles
omitted the fact that not all trans and intersex people
experience GD. Arguments in the literature required
the distress factor to conform to the distress merits
medical intervention ideal. As such, articles only par-
tially appropriate the DSM-5’s diagnosis to support
claims that the diagnosis ensures clinical interventions
by a multidisciplinary team and that health insurance
payments would unlikely be forthcoming without a di-
agnosis (7.9%: Supplementary Table S7). A narrative
about access to clinical interventions and health insur-
ance payments on the basis of not suffering distress or
impairment to social functioning would indeed seem
odd.
To apply a diagnosis to all who require medical in-
terventions and who do not suffer dysphoria or impair-
ment to social functioning with a diagnosis of GD is
also medically questionable. This is especially so for
those who, before being offered medical interventions,
must demonstrate GD. In these articles then, the psy-
chiatric diagnosis functions as a gatekeeping check in
socioeconomic climates, such as in the United States,
that requires a diagnosis for medical interventions and/
or the granting of legal gender recognition, leaving
the question whether a psychiatric diagnosis’ validity
should be about pathology or should it be used to aid
any secondary gains, such as citizenship rights.49
The post-transition speciﬁer diagnosis was explained
in just >2% (Supplementary Table S8) of the articles, as
a stage after some treatment and when the trans person
requires ongoing treatment, but is ‘‘no longer gender
dysphoric’’—no literature mentioned the post-transition
speciﬁer in relation to intersex people. The primary pur-
pose of this post-transition speciﬁer is to facilitate med-
ical insurance payments for ongoing interventions that
may continue to occur after distress has been resolved—
for example, to allow for ongoing hormone therapy.2
Some of these articles acknowledged this.
The post-transition speciﬁer was modeled on the
concept of ‘‘remission’’50; however, this does not
make much sense for nondysphoric or nonimpaired in-
dividuals who may have transitioned. If someone is
nondysphoric/nonimpaired originally, then logically
no remission of dysphoria can take place. If the post-
transition speciﬁer of GD is applied to nondysphoric/
nonimpaired people, this would result in a false posi-
tive diagnosis, which has further implications for our
analysis about the prevalence of GD hereunder.
Because of the confusing diagnosis, understandably,
there has been a host of conceptual issues conﬂated in
the articles analyzed. Implicitly and explicitly present-
ing GD in this way results in a narrative of distress
that may not always be warranted and thus the validity
of the diagnosis of GD is brought into question on
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grounds of the illogicality of remission, when the DSM
states that not all people suffer distress.
Types of People with Distress
GD prevalence
The rationale behind the GD diagnosis in the DSM-5
was to offer clinicians a common language and orientate
them toward accurate and dependable diagnoses. Epide-
miologically, some (7.8%: Supplementary Table S9)
commented on the prevalence of GD. However, preva-
lence statistics were typically derived from the number
of people referred to gender clinics, implicitly suggesting
that everyone who is referred meets the diagnostic crite-
rion for GD, which may not be the case (and, conversely,
also assuming that everyone experiencing GD accesses
gender identity services).
There were numerous terminology conﬂations
(transgender/transsexual/GID/GD), making it difﬁcult
to clearly understand the number of people actually
suffering with GD because the classiﬁcation systems
used have varied over time. Many authors have used
GD inconsistently within the articles on prevalence,
for example, conﬂating GID, GD, and transsexualism
(52%: Supplementary Table S9 references *). The diag-
nostic criteria for GID, GD, and transsexualism may
overlap, but are not identical. It, therefore, cannot be
assumed that prevalence ﬁgures for one set of diagnos-
tic criteria can be simply applied to another and conse-
quently cannot underpin any validity claims.
Etiology
Similarly, a few articles (3.5%: Supplementary Table S10)
discussed questions about what ‘‘caused’’ GD in bio-
medical terms. However, in almost all these cases,
they appeared to be looking at possible causes of in-
congruence between assigned gender and experienced
gender, and not seeking the causes of distress. For in-
stance, in a meta-synthesis, Arcelus et al.51(p. 809)
searched for ‘‘Transsexualism, gender identity disor-
der or gender dysphoria [which] must be diagnosed
according to DSM-III, DSM-IIIR, DSM-IV, DSM-
IV-TR, DSM-V [sic], ICD-9, ICD-10, or Benjamin cri-
teria’’ to be included in their study. Other articles (3.5%:
Supplementary Table S11) argued that there were no
discernable biological evidence of GD.
The DSM-5 explicitly states that diverse gender
identities are not in themselves disordered, and disor-
der solely relates to distress. Yet the articles discussing
GD’s ‘‘etiology’’ in terms of seeking biomedical causes
for a particular ‘‘nonconforming gender identity’’ clearly
presume that such identities themselves require medi-
cal explanation. Moreover, if the intention of research
is to understand links between biology and gender
identity, it is methodologically weak to attempt to do
so by looking solely at clinically referred populations
for whom gender diversity is causing distress or im-
pairment. Moreover, the DSM-5 clearly points to the
existence of gender diverse populations who do not
experience distress or impairment, prevalence studies
then do not contribute to the validity of any tools de-
termining GD.
Presumption of ‘‘dysphoria’’ in a given
population group
GD was used as a descriptor for a group of people, for
example, those who had a history of GD, those under-
going transitioning medical procedure, or those who
had been referred to a gender clinic, who may or may
not have been diagnosed with GD. A large majority
of articles did not make it clear whether ‘‘clinically sig-
niﬁcant distress’’ or social impairment had been estab-
lished, or even assessed by a clinician or the researcher.
Other international diagnostic criteria in common use
in the articles, such as the ICD-10’s52 gender identity
categories, do not include distress as a criterion. It,
therefore, cannot be automatically assumed that pa-
tients accessing gender services or undergoing tran-
sition medical procedures necessarily experienced
distress, especially in jurisdictions wherein the ICD-
10 is used in preference to the DSM.
In addition, the post-transition speciﬁer within the
DSM-5 also allows for the possibility that some people
may have a prior diagnosis of GD, but not currently
be experiencing distress. Inexact use of the term GD,
therefore, carries a danger of presuming ubiquitous dis-
tress in a population group wherein levels of distress
are in fact not known as we demonstrate hereunder.
Research samples and gender dysphoric patients
Within research populations (14% of articles, see Sup-
plementary Table S12), the timing or location of the
ﬁeldwork, the age of the participants, and in the case
of intersex people before 2013 were diagnosable under
different criteria and made it highly unlikely that the in-
dividuals researched had been diagnosed with GD. The
timeframe required to make it into print, for some of
the articles, would account for some of this discrepancy,
however, not for all of them.
As already noted, only 2.5% of articles used the post-
speciﬁer concept. Surprisingly, however, was that the
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post-transition speciﬁer was not used in all the arti-
cles describing the long-term follow-up of research
participants who had previously received medical
interventions related to their gender identity. Such
participants were described using terminology such as
‘‘gender dysphoric’’ without reference to the possi-
bility that their dysphoria might have been alleviated
through the interventions they had received. There is
much evidence to suggest that various medical inter-
ventions are desired and required by trans people.53,54
In most cases, this is to alleviate the pressure of living a
gender that they were not assigned at birth.55,56 The
empirical basis for treatment options and long-term
outcomes with regard to intersex patient preferences
are insufﬁcient.57 Nonetheless, continuing to describe
all trans and intersex people as ‘‘gender dysphoric’’
long after treatment is inconsistent with the claims
about the suitability and effectiveness of treatments re-
ceived by trans (and intersex) people that were made
within the very same articles.
Popular Discourses Within the Literature
Hierarchies of dysphoria
Several articles (4.6%: Supplementary Table S13) de-
scribed transsexualism as an extreme form of GD, or
stated that only people with extreme GD would seek
medical transition. This characterization that transsex-
ualism is the most extreme form of GD and associated
with a desire to medically transition reiﬁes and reintro-
duces hierarchies of need between trans, intersex, and
gender diverse people. The language about ‘‘extreme’’
GD in the reviewed articles assumes that there is direct
correlation between severity of distress and bodily in-
tervention choices an individual will make. No evi-
dence was provided in the articles to support this
implied correlation nor does gradated levels of GD ap-
pear in current diagnostic texts.
Older texts (notably Benjamin58) do directly posit a
hierarchy in which there are ‘‘true’’ transsexuals, who
have the most extreme form of gender incongruence,
and are presumed to most likely to be ‘‘successful’’ tran-
sitioners. Medical services have often been designed
with mental health professionals serving mainly as
‘‘gatekeepers’’ to gender-afﬁrming hormone therapy
and surgery.59(p. 441) The gatekeeping is predicated on
the assumption that it is clinically important to distin-
guish between these ‘‘true’’ transsexuals and individuals
with other forms of gender diversity, who are perceived
to be more likely to regret interventions. However, the
concept of ‘‘true transsexualism’’ is no longer present,
and the current standards of care emphasize the role
of professionals to be supportive rather than gatekeep-
ers. Articles that imply a hierarchy of GD are, there-
fore, replicating outdated notions of the role of medical
services.
The persistence of this idea of hierarchy potentially
derives, in part, from the apparent crossover between
three different texts used in a majority of the medi-
cal/clinical articles: the ICD-10, DSM-IV, and DSM-5.
In the ICD-10, ‘‘transsexualism’’ is a subtype of GID
(although it is not explicitly termed as the most ex-
treme subtype), but GD is not a diagnosis in the man-
ual. In theDSM-IV’s GID diagnosis, there is no subtype
of transsexualism. The DSM-5’s deﬁnition of GD is not
synonymous with ICD-10 deﬁnitions. In, particular the
ICD-10 does not require that distress be present. Trans-
sexualism is, therefore, neither a subtype of GD nor a
direct analogue in any diagnostic manual even though
a number of articles seen in Supplementary Table S12
deem it to be the same phenomena.
GD and ‘‘disorders of sex development’’
A somewhat separate narrative relates to people with
intersex conditions (often termed DSD in the litera-
ture), although this is disputed term.60 Some articles
explicitly stated that GD and intersex were distinct.
However, the new diagnostic criterion allows psychia-
trists to diagnose GD for people with intersex condi-
tions comparably with trans people.
Much of the medical literature regarding GD and
intersex conditions in this review focused upon deci-
sions around birth assignation, and the possibility
that ‘‘gender dysphoria’’ might occur later. The applica-
tion of the term GD for those with variations of sex
development61 serves a euphemizing function, disguis-
ing the responsibility of medical professionals and par-
ents who take decisions to socially and surgically assign
young children to a gender category and, in many
cases, utilize medical interventions to ‘‘normalize’’ the
morphology of the body. Most authors did not discuss
ethical questions about assigning intersex people a gen-
der or using clinical interventions, despite an acknowl-
edgment that subsequent distress with the gender
assignation was a possible outcome.
Diagnosing GD as a consequence of clinical child-
hood interventions with intersex people raises funda-
mental questions about the original assignment by
doctors and/or parents. However, none of the articles
referred to this. The fact that some intersex people
who later experience clinically signiﬁcant distress or
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impairment related to their gender in these cases ren-
ders assignment at birth practices problematic.
Furthermore, the popular narrative of GD is that it is
distress arising from incongruence between people’s
experienced gender identity and their ‘‘biological’’ gen-
der. However, intersex people, by deﬁnition, have bio-
logical characteristics that do not entirely align with
classiﬁcations of a male or female gender. How then
can congruence or incongruence between biology and
identity be correctly deﬁned within these (9.5%: Sup-
plementary Table S14) articles? The lack of evidence
underpinning the diagnosis of GD in the DSM-5 in
relation to intersex people is obvious here.
Few texts centered on intersex people’s own feelings
or experiences regarding their identity. Rather, their
GD feelings or experiences were discussed within a bio-
medical paradigm and, thus, cannot contribute to the
content validity of GD as distress or impairment in so-
cial functioning.
Conclusion
We have drawn together some of the main narrative
characterizations of GD from 387 articles and high-
lighted three key themes: distress and diagnosis, types
of people, and popular discourse. Although the stated
intention of the DSM-5 was to focus diagnosis upon
distress and impairment, we have demonstrated that
this is inconsistently applied within the literature.
Some articles ignore the reference to distress entirely,
whereas others imply distress where it may never
have been present, or may have subsided.
Frequent changes of terminology, and crossover be-
tween medicalized and identity terms, appear to have
contributed to conﬂation and confusion to the extent
that GD is sometimes referred to as a speciﬁc diagnosis;
sometimes as a phenomenological experience of dis-
tress; and sometimes as a personal characteristic within
individuals. This frequent diverse usage of ‘‘gender dys-
phoria,’’ and the application of the concept to popula-
tions who may neither meet diagnostic criteria nor
experience distress may potentially undermine the sta-
ted intention of the APA that the new diagnosis of GD
would reduce pathologization.
We have also pointed to the replication within the
academic literature of popular discourses of GD, rooted
in normative assumptions about which forms of med-
ical intervention with regard to bodily sex development
should be treated as uncontroversial and inherently
justiﬁed, and which should be seen as requiring special
justiﬁcation. The DSM-5’s redeﬁnition of GD does not
appear to have resolved concerns with regard to the sci-
entiﬁcity or content validity of the diagnosis related to
medical transition or intersex experiences.
Appropriate terminology with regard to gender di-
versity has been a longstanding and frequently fraught
debate. There has been broad support for the APA’s ex-
plicit recognition that gender diversity should not be
universally pathologized and that the focus of health
and social care professionals should be upon reducing
distress and impairment to facilitate gender diverse
people’s equitable participation within society. How-
ever, these positive aims are most likely to be fulﬁlled
if concepts of ‘‘gender dysphoria’’ are clearly deﬁned
by clinicians, researchers, theorists, and publishers,
underpinned by robust evidence, critical analysis, and
peer review that is rooted within the lived experience
of gender diverse people and communities.
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